We look at compulsory licensing of intellectual property as remedy for anti-competitive practice. We identify aspects of intellectual property that warrants a different remedy from those using general definitions and remedies for essential facility. Based on the analysis, we present a characterisation of optimal compulsory licensing for a simple market.
Introduction
An input or factor of production becomes an "essential facility" when there is no economically viable substitute for the input so that owner of the input is able to exercise market power in the output or the final good market and that market is sufficiently important for overall welfare. Not economically viable means that although it might be physically possible to duplicate the input, the cost would be too large for the society. One way to reduce the efficiency loss from market power in the final goods market is for the authority to "declare" the input and mandate access to competitors. This realizes a static efficiency gain without cost of duplicating the input. However there may be a dynamic cost to achieving that static gain since a firm could anticipate this action and never bother to invest in the input. Then the input and thus the final product may never be available.
Intellectual property bestows on its owner the ability to exclude others from using the information or technology. The owner of the intellectual property is able to exercise market power over whatever product requires the patented technology or copyrighted software. The intellectual property is very much like an essential facility in this sense. Instead of treating intellectual property as a type of essential facility and using declaration as remedy, intellectual property laws typically include a different remedy for static inefficiency -compulsory licensing. As with declaration, dissipating rents through compulsory licensing will reduce returns from R&D investment which could discourage innovation resulting in dynamic loss.
The object of this paper is to analyze in some detail the similarities and differences between essential facilities and intellectual property and their respective remedies, declaration and compulsory licensing.
It is important to note that the intellectual property system is explicitly designed to promote innovation. A remedy that reduces the incentive to innovate has precisely the opposite effect. Because intellectual property is essentially information, it has properties that are different from other inputs and goods whose boundaries are defined physically. This suggests method of compulsory licensing could differ from a standard access pricing rules of essential facility.
In practice there are two types of compulsory licensing. First is compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products. Recent examples are licensing of anti-HIV/AIDS drugs in South Africa and the anthrax antibiotic ciprofloxacin in Canada. The motivation behind compulsory licensing seems to be the gain in consumer surplus in the form of saved lives. Lives, not market efficiency, are at stake when the income level is such that monopoly prices are prohibitively expensive for most of the population. The concept of dead-weight loss takes on a macabre second meaning in this case.
The second type of compulsory licensing is to remedy an anti-competitive behaviour, such as foreclosure, in a market of products that rely on the patent. In other words, it seeks to promote competition rather than to address consumer welfare directly. We consider this second type of compulsory licensing. Our interpretation is that this is what the recent Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee in Australia was concerned with.
We also focus on those aspects of the role of intellectual property that are unique to smaller countries such as Australia and New Zealand. In 1999, 90% of Australian patents were granted to non-residents and 87% of New Zealand patents were granted to non-residents. Among larger economies, the shares of non-residents among patent grantees is much smaller. For the same year, the share of non-resident grantees were 45% in U.S., 50% at EPO and 11% in Japan (Table 1) . This suggests that in Australia and New Zealand, R&D investment required to develop the new patented technology is typically not borne by domestic firms, unlike U.S. and other larger economies. Assuming inventors would first patent in their home country, technologies patented in Australia and New Zealand are likely to have already been patented elsewhere. The patent system's roles for promoting innovation and disseminating information are correspondingly less relevant in Australia or New Zealand compared with larger economies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we compare "essential facility" and "patented technologies". Comparison of the remedies, "declaration" and "compulsory licensing" follow. We then analyze what "compulsory licensing" as recommended the by the Committee. This includes characterisation of socially optimal licensing fees when fees (fixed fee and royalty), and effect of threat of compulsory licensing on innovation. We end with some concluding remarks.
2 "Essential facility" and "patented technol-
ogy"
A factor of production is an essential facility when duplication of the input or a close substitute is uneconomical so that the owner or producer of the input is able to extend its monopoly power over the input to market power over another market, namely the output market. In addition, essential facilities must have some significance for the economy as a whole. Examples of essential facilities include a port, railroad line or station, power transmission and local telecommunications network. The outputs will be respectively docking services, railway services, electricity retail services, and telecommunication services.
Market power is typically exercised by excluding competitors from the output market by denying or restricting access to the essential facility. This has the effect of foreclosing the downstream market in which the essential input is used to supply other (often retail) goods and services. A firm may accomplish this by vertically integrating the downstream production, using exclusionary contracts with a particular producer, or by charging very high access fees for the facility.
Intellectual property is a system for promoting innovation. By legally defining the boundary of the property, it allows the owner to appropriate rents by excluding others. The extent and duration of the exclusion is determined with reference to two trade offs. One trade off is static loss against dynamic gain. Static loss is from the market power as result of ability to exclude. This leads to inefficiency with deadweight loss close to the monopoly deadweight loss. However by allowing the patent owner to obtain the above normal profits, the presence of an exclusive right makes it worthwhile for someone to commit resources and undertake innovation. This is the dynamic gain. The strength or extent of patent protection will change the balance between the loss and gain.
The other trade off is between the static market inefficiency and the disclosure of information. In return for the right to exclude others, disclosure of the technology is required to obtain a patent. In contrast, if an inventor resorts to trade secrets, she can also exclude others from using the technology without disclosing the information.
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If the protected intellectual property is necessary for production of a good, it effectively gives the owner the right to exclude others from producing this good. In case of patents, the patented technology could cover a production process or input material. In case of a software copyright, it may be necessary for operating a computer or a machine or for providing services such as inventory management or accounting. By definition, exact duplication of patented technology or copyrighted software is prohibitively costly, not least because doing so would expose the duplicator to legal action.
Invention of a close substitute ("invent around") may be physically possible, even patentable or copyrightable. However there are possible infringement litigation costs which must be taken into account in addition to the physical process of inventing the close substitute. Such costs may effectively lead to lack of economically viable substitutes for the technology or the soft-ware. This implies that the intellectual property covering the technology or software may be an essential facility. This can lead to foreclosure and other anti-competitive behaviour by the intellectual property owner.
Essential facilities and intellectual property both confer exclusionary power on their owners by virtue of the absence of economically viable close substitutes. They differ in the reason for the existence of this power however. Patents are by definition a right to exclude others from using the technology. Essential facilities may be such because of their physical properties (e.g. a port occupying a natural harbour) or by past decisions. Put slightly differently, market power associated with an essential facility arises because of the absence of a specific legal action (declaration) to remove it, whereas market power associated with intellectual property arises because of the presence of a specific legal protection (patenting).
Both require significant capital investment to obtain and thus duplication may be socially very wasteful. This is critical in justifying a remedy. This is because with both inputs, once the investment has been sunk and essential facility built or technology obtained, there is only gain from giving others access. Gain comes from reducing static dead-weight loss. However if the static gains are too great (for example, if the access price is set too low) there can be adverse dynamic consequences. If duplication were not prohibitively expensive, a more market oriented approach would have less harmful dynamic consequences.
An important difference between essential facilities and intellectual property is that the cost of substitutes is outside the control of policy for the former but is endogenous for the latter. Consider an essential facility such as a telecommunications network. The cost of duplication or the construction of a close substitute is determined by physical costs, and over time by technological progress, neither of which policy variables. In case of patents however, the extent of monopoly power or equivalently the cost of producing a close substitute, can be changed by changed by changing breadth of patent protection. Narrower breadth means more similar technologies fall outside the extent of patent protection. This should make "inventing around" using disclosed patent information cheaper. Narrower breadth will also make it more costly for the patent owner to prove infringement which reduces litigation. Narrower breadth will make expected litigation costs lower for the imitator. Thus changing breadth of protection can reduce the cost of close substitutes which may be sufficient to prevent foreclosure. This is a possible remedy for anti-competitive use of patents which is not available for general essential facilities.
There is an alternative to patents for protecting technology -trade secrets. Using this approach involves an attempt to physically prevent access to information. However once someone has independently obtained the information, there is no way to exclude them from using the technology. On the other hand, trade secrets provide no help to those wanting to "invent around" since no information is revealed. In case of patents, the disclosure required to obtain patent protection can help invention of close of substitutes. In this sense patents are more socially desirable than trade secrets. If compulsory licensing makes patents less attractive, technologies may be protected by trade secrets. This must be taken into account when considering a remedy.
Intellectual property has features that differentiate it from other goods and factors of production. First of all, use of information is physically nonexclusive. Unlike ports or telecommunications networks, both of which are subject to congestion, it is possible for any number of people or firms to use intellectual property at the same time. In addition, unlike physical assets, once someone has acquired the information, it is impossible for the owner to prevent this person from sharing it with someone else. In fact this is why one needs the concept of intellectual property -there are no physical boundaries that define extent of the property.
Another special feature of information is that it will not physically de-preciate from use nor will it require maintenance. Thus there is no physical direct cost of using this input.
2 Harbour and telecommunications network must be run using resources. They also depreciate physically and require resources for it to be maintained. The fair access fee needs to cover this cost of using the asset. Such reimbursement is not necessary for using intellectual property.
Small Country Issues
In Australia or New Zealand, most of the patented technologies were developed abroad (Table 1) . Patents are designed to provide incentive for firms to invest in R&D by granting monopoly rents in return for disclosing the technology. Clearly in Australia and New Zealand these are not the primary functions of a patent. Patented technologies would have been invented abroad where firms made their R&D investment decisions based on profits from larger markets, typically US, EU or Japan. Reducing monopoly rents from Australia or New Zealand may therefore not have such a large cost in lost innovation as it would if those rents were dissipated in larger economies. Similarly, the information disclosure function of the patent system is not very important in smaller economies. Since technologies are usually patented abroad (and return to investment guaranteed elsewhere), firms and individuals in Australia and New Zealand can obtain the knowledge from patent disclosure in other countries.
However patenting in a small market is necessary in order for the inventor to appropriate rents from the small market. Since the information is available elsewhere, if the inventor does not obtain a patent, someone else could do so and exclude the inventor from the market. If no one obtains a patent, rents will be dissipated because the technology would be used freely by many. A patent's sole purpose is to exert market power. Thus restricting market power of patent protection will lead to static gain while dynamic loss from discouraging innovation or less information disclosure would be close to none.
These international issues do not arise to the same extent with essential facilities. The cost of initially constructing major infrastructural assets such as telecommunication networks or railroads, is typically borne domestically. Even if it is not, there is no real prospect of adjusting policy settings such that a greater static gain is obtained without more dynamic loss. This is primarily because such significant additional capital investment is required to extend (say) telephone services into a new country. Consequently, we expect the essential facility doctrine and remedy incentives in other countries to be just as valid here.
3 "Declaration" and "compulsory licensing"
Declaration of essential facility
Access to essential facilities in Australia involves a process beginning with an application to the National Competition Council to have the service "declared". The Council may recommend declaration of a service if it is satisfied that 1. access to the service would promote competition 2. that it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service 3. the facility is of national significance 4. access would not cause undue risk to health or safety 5. access is not already the subject of an effective regime, and 6. access would not be against the public interest.
Compulsory licensing of patented technology
The Review Committee Report recommends that an order requiring a compulsory license to be made if and only if all of the following conditions are met:
1. access to the patented invention is required for the competition in the (relevant) market 2. there is a public interest in enhanced competition in that market 3. reasonable requirements for such access have no been met 4. the order will have the effect of allowing these reasonable requirement to be better met, and 5. the order will not compromise the legitimate interest of the patent owner, including that owner's right to share in the return society obtains from the owner's invention and to benefit from any successive invention, made within the patent term, that relies on the patent.
Such order should be obtainable on application first to the Australian Competition Tribunal,with rights of appeal to the full Federal Court.
Comparison
Both "declaration" and "compulsory licensing" attempt to remedy the existence of an entry barrier that is deterring competition in a market. Both require the establishment of the fact that the object (facility or patent) is hindering competition. In case of declaration, a facility is considered an entry barrier when it is not economical to duplicate it. There is no such requirement for compulsory licensing. In this sense the compulsory licensing requirement is more proactive. At the same time, lack of this requirement may lead to abuse.
Compulsory licensing is more explicit about what the patent owner is entitled to when the remedy is used. Recommendation 5 could be interpreted as saying that the patentee should get monopoly profit with compulsory licensing. This can be from the final product market or from subsequent innovations. However this would contradict the point of this remedy which is to introduce competition. It is impossible for patent owner to get monopoly profit while there is competition due to the efficiency effect.
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Entitlement for the owner of the essential facility is subsumed in requirement 6 of the declaration condition. In this case, the public interest would be interpreted as being the aggregate interest of consumers and firms. Consumers will gain from competition in the market and the firm that gains access to the essential facility will now have positive profit. The public interest condition means that access to the facility should not erode facility owner's profit so much that a rational firm will never investment in the essential facility. If there were no telecommunication network, consumers will be very much worse-off.
Economics of "declaring and essential facility"
The fact that incumbent invested in the facility means
where π m is the monopoly profit and f is the cost of the facility. The fact that duplication is uneconomical and that it is an entry barrier means If market efficiency can be achieved in some other way, there is never incentive to duplicate the essential facility,
where W d is the duopoly social surplus. In fact this inequality is true for any social surplus. There is always social benefit from competition,
where W m is the monopoly social surplus. These benefits provide incentive for a facility to be always "declared". However if the incumbent's profit were really reduced to π d after declaration and the incumbent rationally anticipated such action, condition (1) means the investment would have never taken place. One can interpret requirement 6 "access would not be against the public interest" to address this problem and that incumbent profit after declaration should be sufficiently large so that the initial investments would take place. It should be noted that there are situations where duplication may be socially beneficial,
This occurs when the consumer surplus gain from competition is very large so that W d − W m is very large, specifically greater than f . Large consumer surplus due to a very competitive market is very likely to lead to small duopoly profit resulting in (1). Even though socially duplication is desirable, there is no private incentive to do so. In this case there is a remedy besides declaration: increase profit of the entrant until it is greater than f . This can be done either by transferring profit from the incumbent or by subsidising the entrant. But the latter may lead to additional inefficiency. This would be a case when "declaration" would be effective.
Economics of "compulsory licensing"
The fact that patentee undertook the innovation means
where k is the R&D investment. The fact that the patent is entry barrier means,
As in case of essential facility, there is always social benefit from avoiding duplication of the invention,
and from competition,
This would result in the same problem of no investment as in the essential facilities case if licensing resulted in duopoly profit for the patent owner since (2) holds. However recommendation 5 "the order will not compromise the legitimate interest of the patent owner" avoids this problem by guaranteeing profit close to π m to the patentee. It cannot be π m itself since then there will be no profit left for the licensee. 
Issues Unique to Australia and New Zealand
For technologies that are developed abroad, the need to guarantee a profit to make R&D incentive compatible would not be an issue. The patentee (typically holding patents in other countries and markets for the same technology) would patent in Australia or New Zealand as long as expected profit were positive. This would support licensing agreements that violate requirement 5. That is, compulsory licensing would be socially desirable and the foreign technology owner will still patent in Australia or New Zealand because otherwise it will obtain no profit at all from these markets.
When is compulsory licensing unnecessary?
Patent licensing sometimes occurs under non compulsory circumstances and such situations should be excluded from any licensing regime. For example, a patent owner may license when she is unable to implement the technology herself, perhaps because she does not own a suitable production facility which would be case for universities or individual inventors. In this case, voluntary licensing allows the patent owner to obtain the resources to implement the patent. Another case in which voluntary licensing would occur is where there is a firm that has lower marginal cost than the patentee. This would particularly make sense if the demand is so large relative to patentee's cost curve that she would be forced to produce in a region where marginal costs increase. There will be benefit from splitting production by licensing to another firm. Thus compulsory license would be necessary only when patentee has no cost disadvantage.
An important case where only compulsory licensing occurs is when the patent covers an intermediate technology. A technology is an intermediate technology when it is result of basic research and requires more research or development research before it becomes a final product. Patents that cover gene sequencing or new chemical compound are such examples. Other sequences might be necessary or determining the effect of gene sequence requires more research and there is no immediate product that uses this patent. Similarly, in order for a new chemical compound to become a useful drug, its efficacy and safety still needs to be determined.
When more risky investment is required until there is a useful product, it may be socially desirable to have many firms engaging in the next innovative step. Because this approach involves some duplication of effort it is not necessarily cost effective. However there may well be situations in which the patent owner would like to be the sole developer of the final product but society would be better off if this were not the case.
Compulsory licensing
In the case of physical essential facility such as telecommunication network or port, the access fee must cover at least the direct cost of using the asset. Use of essential facility can be measured in units and there is a direct cost associated with each unit. Thus, the access fee takes form of per unit of fee, i.e., a price.
A intellectual property is either used or not. There is no concept of "units" of technology.
5 When a person uses a patented technology or copyrighted software, this will not prevent anyone else from using it at the same time nor will it depreciate quality of the information. Thus there is no direct cost of using information. Lack of units means there is no natural way of defining price or the marginal cost of using information. Fortunately it is impossible to over use information and there is really no need for marginal cost. Therefore, apart from the dynamic (investment) issues, the terms on which intellectual property is licensed only has efficiency consequences on the output market. Efficient use of information, in contrast to an efficient use of network, is not an issue. Absent of natural pricing units, the access fee of intellectual property can be a one time fixed fee or per output unit price, i.e., royalty. 
Fixed fee versus royalty
We employ a very simple model of two firms engaged in production of a homogeneous good. The patent covers a process innovation technology. Using the patented technology reduces marginal cost of production of final good from c O (old marginal cost) to c N , where c N < c O . The demand function for the output linear,
where p is price and q is total output. We denote patent owner by P and the licensee by L. Prior to compulsory license, P is the incumbent, the sole producer of the final product and L is the potential entrant unable to enter because it has no access to the patented technology. We assume firms engage in Cournot competition.
Patented technology is barrier to entry
Higher cost of production per se does not prevent entry. The cost difference must be sufficiently large so that L would not be able to enter the market if it produces with old technology and marginal cost c O . Given that it is Cournot competition, this occurs if
Entry will be blockaded when this condition holds. P is the sole producer and it collects monopoly profit,
Compulsory licensing will give L access to the patented technology and its marginal cost will also be c N . Although there was a case where a U.S. Court ordered compulsory licensing with zero fee, usually the patent owner is guaranteed some compensation with compulsory licensing. 7 We denote by v the minimum total profit (profit from sales of output plus licensing fee).
Fixed fee
Fixed fee F must be paid from L to P . Both firms have marginal cost c N . Profit from sales of the output for each firm is the Cournot profit with symmetric costs,
The net profits given the licensing payment F are
Total output is,
Greater the output, greater the social surplus and smaller the deadweight loss. Fixed fee does not affect the marginal profit and output decisions of the firms. The fixed fee is purely a transfer from licensee to patent owner and does not effect market efficiency. We can identify conditions that F must satisfy for it to be feasible. L 7 Dell Corporation VL Bus Patents, 1997.
should not make a loss, so F must satisfy
If P must be guaranteed v,
Any F that satisfy these two equations are optimal. There will no difference in the size of social surplus among the feasible fees F . The maximum possible π F P is 2π C which is less than the monopoly profit π M due to the efficiency effect.
Proposition 1. With fixed fee licensing, the final good market will be Cournot oligopoly with identical marginal costs, c N . The sum of profits will always be 2π C for any incentive compatible F . Fixed fee determines how this is allocated between patent owner and licensee. With positive fee, patent owner gets more than Cournot equilibrium profit and licensee gets less. With zero fee, both get exactly the Cournot equilibrium profit.
Royalty
L will pay P royalty r per unit of output produced using the the patented technology. This means L's marginal cost is effectively c N + r. The market will be Cournot oligopoly with asymmetric marginal costs, c N and c N + r. The equilibrium outputs are,
The equilibrium profits will be,
P 's profit is concave in r and is maximised at r = a−c N 2
. When r = 0, profit is the Cournot equilibrium profit with symmetric marginal costs, π C .
The maximum is the monopoly profit,
meaning with this marginal cost, condition (3) holds with equality if we substitute c O = c N + r. This is such a high royalty fee that it increases L's effective cost to a level where it is indifferent between producing (get zero profit) and not producing.
which is decreasing in r. Higher r effectively increases marginal cost for L. L produces less in equilibrium as result and although P produces more, the total output decreases. Unlike fixed cost, royalty effects marginal profitability and thus the equilibrium outputs. Socially optimal royalty, r * is the smallest r that satisfies π r P ≥ v.
Proposition 2. With royalty licensing, there is an optimal royalty r * . At this level, patent owner's profit is exactly the minimum level, v. Licensee's profit will be strictly less than π C .
With zero royalty, market will be Cournot equilibrium with symmetric costs, c N . Each firm gets the Cournot equilibrium profit.
Note that with royalty, it is possible for π r P to be greater than 2π C .
Effect of threat of compulsory licensing
Let (π P , π L ) be the profit allocations of patent owner (π P ) and the potential rival, a potential licensee (π L ).
If there is no system of compulsory licensing, π P = π m and π L = 0. Patent owner has no incentive to share the technology and will be a monopolist in the product market. If compulsory licensing is implemented, then net profits would bē
where α is share of profit that licensee pays to the patent owner. Even if the compulsory licensing is not actually implemented, the possibility changes the bargaining positions of patentee and the potential licensee. Specifically, if we denote by π A the sum of profits that two firms can achieve, we can define a Nash Bargaining Game with feasible set
and disagreement point (π P ,π L ). The Nash Bargaining Solution allocation is,
Since π A ≤ π m , patentee is worse-off with possibility of compulsory licensing.
If π A ≥ 2π d , the (potential) licensee is better-off with possibility of compulsory licensing. Note that this is true for any π A such that 2π
Firms will be strictly worse-off or better-off when the inequalities are strict. If the patentee is a foreign firm and licensee is a domestic firm, the domestic firm will always support compulsory licensing. This is independent of if the resulting product market is more competitive or not. That is, even if
Threat of compulsory licensing will always make patentee worse off. This means there will be innovations that would not be undertaken as result of threat of compulsory licensing that would have been undertaken otherwise.
Concluding Remarks
Because intellectual property is a information good with properties different from other goods, having a separate remedy, compulsory licensing, when it becomes an essential facility is good public policy. The special nature of information also requires licensing fee structure different from access pricing for declared essential facilities. Because efficient use of the facility which is information in case of intellectual property is not an issue, only efficiency in the final good market needs to be considered. Royalty payment results in greater choice among profits and consumer welfare in the final good market.
